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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The increased industrial aot1vity 1n the United States
which 1s brought about through a re- armament program, due
to war or threats of war , brings w1th it a number of
c r itical questions.

One of the most important of these

questions conoerns allocation of manpower r esources with
r esult1ng impact upon wages.
In an eoonon17 already operating at peak levels of
production a.hd employment. hon much "give" is there in a

labor force to meat the demands of an emergency? Careful plans have to be ma.de to conceive the r esources of
skilled manpower because the str ength 11es 1n the sk111

and pr oductivity of 1ts labor force , r ather than in
sheer numbers.].

In this century, the United States has been faced
with national emergencies such as war or near war at
least four times.

Beg1nn1ng with World War I . World War

1 w1ll1am c. ? erguson, "An Analysis of the Wa ge
Stab1l1zat1on Board's Cr1ter1a 1n Wage Determ1nat1on, 11
Bureau of Labor and Management , State Un1ver s1ty of Iowa ,
1955 , p. 5.
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II . the Korean War , and now the View Nam Confl1ot ,
the Amer1oa.n economy has had to adjust 1ts ways of
thinking and its actions to meet these emergencies.
In August , 1950, the labor foroe totaled over 65
million w1th l½ m1111on 1n the armed forces and 65

m1111on 1n the c1v1l.1an labor force. 2 The consumer
demand st1ll reflected ca1nly production for the c1V111an economy of automob1les , houses, and a great vari-

ety of other o1v1l1an goods and serV1oes.

The expanded

defense program. called for an increase 1n the size of
the armed forces and, at the same time, for a sharp ex-

pansion 1n the production of aircraft. tanks, and other
types of equipment and supplies.

To fill this need for

greater manpower there was room for reduction 1n the
number

or

unemployed from the August level of 2~ m11-

11on, but the major manpower requirements had to be met
by

a sh1f't of some, of the 62 m1111on already employed.

The most important sources of manpower for sta.ff1ng defense plants consisted of workers then on the job.
In co~e 1ndustr1es, they were automat1cally available
2 ntabor Supply Aspect of Mobilization. " Monthly
Labor Review, November, 1950, pp. 564- 567.

3
for the expand1ng war effort.

Many

workers employed

1n trade and service 1ndustr1ea or engaged 1n small

marginal businesses were attracted by the relatively
higher wage structure in the oxpand1ng war 1ndustr1es.
At th1s time alone. there were 75 . 000 colleet1ve

barga.1n1ng agreements 1n force , and more than 12. 000
of these were re-negotiated ea.oh year. In nearly every
instance when agreements between un1ons and employers
were renewed, wages 11ere an 1ssue, and when the part1es

failed to agree , wages were the most frequent souroo of
disagreement.

The Nature of the Study

over the years, unions have become powerful institutions 1n the American economy. 3 These organ1zat1ons
.h ave grown rapidly in e1ze and have extended their jur1s-

dict1on to include virtually all of the mass production

1ndustr1es .1n the nat1on.

They are now eztend1ng 1nto

the area of white collar workers and even the teaoh1ng
field.

Unions have not only increased their membership

3walter L • .IAayldn, "F1nanc1al Regula tions of Unions
Under the Taft Hartley Act , " Bureau of Labor and Manage~
ment, State Un1vers1ty or !owa, 1950, p. 21.
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but • bocQuss of the forces or the social and economic
environments , they have begun to assume the form of
1ndustry-w1de organ1zat1ons.

1s so great

and

Since th1a union growth

continued and because labor unrest ls

most preval.ent during natlonal emergencies , there 1s

a def1n1te need to protect public welfare and safety.
There are very few aot1v1t1es affecting wages,

hours , and oond1t1ons of employment, e1thor d1reotly
or 1nd1rectly, that are not considered barga1nable
issues 1n the f1eld of oolleotive barga1n1ng.

Th1s

increased power of unions has permitted these organ!•

zat1 .~ns- t-o mold to a degree . the attitudes of members
and, consequently. to regUl.ate the 11ves of m1111ons. 4
One of the most critical questions in recent yea.rs
has been vhetheg;:o oolleotive wage determination can be
compatible u1th the national ob3ect1ve of ma.1ntaln1ng

flill productivity with a stable general level of prices.
Th~ Need for the Studf
A

clear W1derstand1ng

or

the economic 1mpl1oat1ons

of the var1ous wage arguments will often d1soouragc extravagant and unwarranted ola1ms.

This will he1p to

5

produce a meet1ng of the minds and prevent disputes
leading to work stoppages, strikes, and lockouts.

A

olear understanding of these wage 1mpl1cat1ons and
their operat1ons w!ll help to prevent 1nflat1on. and
w11l aid !n the eff'ect1ve prosecut1on

or

l-1ar.

[t

u1ll.

assist in the proper al.location of resow-ces , or
ass1at 1n WlY other emergency.

It le the purpose of

th1s thesis to d1sausa and analyze the policies o~ the
Wage control Boards. their compos1t1on. jur1sd1ct1on,

sanctions, and the pr1nc1ples established 1n dealing
w1th these emergency o.d3ustmenta , partloularl7 with
respeot to wages.

Scope of the Study
Beoc;1.uso of the educational background and expGr1en-

ces of the writer. and for the interest of the readers,
this report shall be i!m1ted to the emergency sltuat1ons
which are commonly referred to as World War I , World War

II . and the Kor~an

war.

S1nce the V1et Mam

1s not a declared war bUt resulted 1n

0

s1tuat1on"

a tremendous 1m-

pact upon the American eoono.cy, a portion will be
1nclucled.

6

Methodol.oSf
This thes1o 1s a historical research projeot , in
I

which the method of refleot1ve th1nk1ng has been applied
to the. problem of wage controls, aided by the ·d!~covery of past trends of events , facts . and att1tudes.

It

attempts to trace llnes of dovelopment in human thought

and action. under an emergency s1tua.t1on, 1n order to
1ndioute come concrete form of social end economic
activity.

Tllo .ms.ter1a1 1n this thesis is found 1n large measure ln published documents of the various government

departments.

Espeo1ally productive and valuable mater-

ials were found 1n the Monthly Labor Review of the

Bureau of !Abor Stat1st1os, The National Income supplement to the Survey of current Business, and the many

cons;resn,.ona1 Records and pamphlet13 of related materials
from the Government P:r1nt1ng Office.

Some very fine

textbooks on the subject and many newapap~rs and maga~

zines were ut111zed.

CHAPTER II
WAR ECONOMY AND '21-IE RATIONALE OF NATIOHAL WAGE
CONTROL BOARDS

During the years that followed the end or World
War II in August . 1945. the people of the Un1ted
States. as well as other free peoples of the world.
beoame 1nereas1ngly aware of the menace of communist
aggres~1on.

The d1plomatio confl1cta that oocurred

chiefly 1n the United Nations Organization and that
came to be known as the "Cold War" were suddenly supplGmcnted by open conf lict th.rough the !nvas1on of
South Korea in June . 1950. by North Korean commun1sts.
Th1s ap~ently minor oonfl1ot in a small country

or

distant As1a. nev6rtheless , made clear . i f the danger
had not been apparent before . that adjustments for adequate m111te.ry defense by eil f ree people were'neoessary
1f they were to survive communist a ggress1on.
A..'1.y per iod 1n which all 1ndustry is highly geared

f or defense production puts a oons1dorable strain on the

economy.

In such an emer gency . the eoonomy may be unable
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to produce a sufficient amount for defense and at the
same t1me satisfy the demand for both consumer goods
and services.

Th1s 1s true beoause the demand for

both investment spending and consumer goods will increase as a result of 1noree.sed lnoome brought about
through defense spending.

Once the economy has

reached a fiul-employment position. oontinued defanse
spen~..!ng Will cause inflation which, 1f permitted to

oont1nue ~ will hamper the war effort.
controlled
Materials Plan
.....,..;;,;;....;;.;...;;;
•.:;;.........;.-:;.;=..;;.--.,;;.;:.;;=-----

As price and profits rise 1n the private secto~

of the econolilY• capital goods producers w11J. bid against
defense g<?od.S p1·odu.cers for the necessary faotors of
production.

Thia will increase the coat of defense pro-

duction. and .the cost of war.

In such an event . it be•

comes essential for the government to set up some type
of controlled materials pl.an• such as that installed

durjI£g both World War II and tho Korean Conflict. Which
allocated the necessary resources fior defense production.

In e~fect. the oontrolled materials plan gives the
defense producers a high priority 1n the purchase of de-

fense materials so that the war effort will not be he.m.pered.

9

frice and Wage Contr~

Even a controlled materials plan does not prevent
inflation.

Although 1t may assure the defense produooro

a f!rst priority . it dooe not prevent the suppl1ers from
charging everyone higher pr1ocs. 1nolud1ns defense producers.

There 1s nothing to prevent non-defense proM

duoers from b1dd1ng aga1nst •eaoh other for the factors
of production, thereby driving prices upward.

If tho

resulting 1nflat1onary gap 1s large a.nd exerts str~ng

pressures on tho price level. it may be neoessary to
adopt price and 11age controls 1n add1t1on to other
eoonom.10 controls. 1n order to check inflation and fac11-

1tate war production.
In t.ndustry • wages are an important cost of pro--

duc t1on item.

To the working forces . wages are the most

souroe of income.

Everyone 1n the ent1re economy ls af-

fected one i-ray or another by wa.gas.

During normal t1m~s•

nagca may be determined throu.gh the channels of colleot1ve
barsaining 0 with the ever present threat of strikes.

Dur-

ing emergencies. such as wars, it 1s 1mperat1ve that

there should be uninterrupted prod.uot1on.

In order to

a1d the colloot1ve bargaining prooedvxea and fao1l1tate
continued war production. it may become necessary for

10
the government to institute wage oontrola.

Both price

and wage controls were used 1.n World War II and the
Korean War ..

ilthough the Wage Stab111zat1on Board represents

somewhat of a setback for wage and prtoe controls, suoh
guideposts are still a very 1mportant part of our overall econom1o mob111zat1on plans under the Off1ce of
c1v11 and Defense Mob111zat1on.

This office has drafted

and published a national plan for c1v11 and defense mo-

b1l1zat1on 1n the event of future emergencies.

The plan

contains measures for both a .11m1ted or general war.
Among other th1ngs , the plan includes the essent1al
"direct" controls to stab1l1ze pr1ces. wages, salaries,
and rents as well as ratlon1ng of basic consumer goods.

In the event of a m1l1tary attack on the United States,
the plan calls for an 1mmed1ate 11freeze 11 of pr1oes,
wages . salar1es , and rents.

Although most of the ant1~1nfl.a.t1onar7 wage controls
are included 1n the Office of C1v11 and Defense Mob111zat1on plans , a special board or committee may well be
necessary, 1n a war s1tuat1on, to look out for the
speo1f1o interest of labor, management , and the public.
The trl-partlte pr1nc1pl$ established 1n the National

ll
.tabor Conforence Board and upheld in the suoceed1ng
boards may bec03e a pr1mary prerequ1a1te for smooth
and continued war-time production without "str1kes,
stoppages and lookouts."

CHAPTER III
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The War labor Conferenoe Board 1orld War I 1
Many

labor d1ff1ou.lt1es; which ·1mpede war produc-

tion marked the early per1od of the United States •
part1c1pat1on in World War I.

This was accompanied by

a lack of centralized pol1oy and respons1b1l1ty 1n

dealing with labor problems.

There were 1noons1sten-

c1es 1n the labor pol1o1es of different bureaus of the

same department.
Labor a.llooat1on 1n accordance With predetermined
requirements was not possible.

The great demand for

labor 1n war 1ndustr1es and the d1vers1ty of wage
rates for skilled labor stimulated "p1rat1ng 11 and constant shifting of ttorkers.

Population sh1ft1ng resulted

1n congestion and inadequate houe1ng; l1v1ng costs 1n

u. s.

111 The National War Labor Board, " Bulletin No. 287.

Department or Labor, Bureau of Stat1st1cs ,
December , 1921, Chapters 1-4.
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many 1nstancos rose faster than wages.

This situation

brought general labor unrest, an inorease 1n strikes
and a threat to vital war production.
The need for industrial stab111ty was w1dely recognized since successful proseout1on of the war effort
requ1~ed harmonious industrial relations.

On April 8 ,

1918, President Woodrow Wilson, by formal proolamat1on,
approved the appointments made by the War Labor Conference Board and made publ1o its authority.

With th1s

step. a oode of 1ndustr1al relations law, wh1oh beoa.me

tha basis for disputes settlement, was born.
The National War Iabor Conference Board ' s chief
execut1ve officer was its secretary.

The organ1zat1on

cons1sted of six departments, each having subord1nate
d1v!s1ons.

The Board was conceived or1g1nally as both

a med1et1on and an arb1trat1on agency.

In praotioe,

howcver 0 1t functioned largely 1n the latter capacity.

cases oe.me to the Board

by

these methods,

(1) by

appeeJ. from the deo1s1ons of other boards . (2} by ref-

erence from other agencies, e.nd

or

(J) by

direct compla1nt. 2

the direct comple.1nt cases under the Board 1 s

2~ - , p. 22.
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jur1sd1ct1on there were 301nt subm1ss1on oases. where
both parties agreed that the 1esue be arbitrated b,J
the Boe.rd.

Tho Board was bound to render a dec1s1on

and the award was b1nd1ng.

There trere alao ex-pa.rte

oases in which one of tho parties refused to submit to
arbitration.

The Board' s dec1s1ons here woro only

recommendatory and not binding.
Wages constituted the major 1ssue co.mine; before

the Board, being involved ln more tllan hal.f the oaocs.3
With respect to wages, two cr1ter1a were outstandJ.nga

(1) comparative wagao, and (2) the llv1ng wage, which
1ncluded ths oost o~ 11v1ng and the m.1n1mw:i budget.
The Board never established a prlnc1ple

or

what should

oonst1tute a living wage but . in spoo1f1e eases . it did
'

establ!sh m1:n1mum wage rates. ' It is not possible to

make a complete test of the or!teria used because the

Boa.rd often failed to state the reasons for 1ts dec1s1ons.
However~ ,.t is poas1bie , by studying some of the deo1-

s1ons, to establish certain pr1no1ples.

In the Moulders •

Case relative to comparative 'Wages . involving employers
1n R1dgeuay. Pennsylvanie. the Board stated:

15
The situation 1n the looal1ty as
regards 11v1ng cond1t1ons , industry, etc. , is praot1eal1y on a par
w1th Waynesboro, and we have therefore fixed the came rate for mou1ders in this case as was fixed 1n the
WanesRoro award. namely 65 cents per
hour. ~
The board reimrked conoerning 1nduetry praettoe.

in the Boston Case , where rates were raised fro.m

J?½

cents to 48 oents per hour,
The increase 1s subatant1al but fa1r.
It 1s r~quired by the increase 1n the
oost of 11V1ng end brings the wage 1n
Boston only up to a parity uith ~'ages
of motormen and conduotors in other
cities of a1m11ar importance . where
the cost of living 1s at most, not
higher than it is 1n Boaton.5

In the corn Produota Refining company Case , the
1mpet;us was given the job evaluat1on. 6 The board stressed the neoess1ty for the grading of pos1t1ona on the
basis of duti.es and responslbill ties 1n order to lay a

found.at1on for equ1 table awards.

In the Worthington

Pum,p and Machlnerv Corporat!.on case , the Board

..

4

~

p. 27.5.

~-·

p.

5
6

92.

I_b1_g. • p. 184.
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encouraged shift d1fferent1e.ls because

or

the undea1r-

ab111ty and greater str~1n.of night work.?

Tho board consistently roJcotod "ab1l1ty to pay"
as a oritieicm.

William B. Taft• in one op1n1on,

sta.tei:
\
The Nat1ol".al War Iabor Board • • • has

held that the financial condition
of tne company 1s not a factor 1n
determ1n1ns what a falr rate of rragQa
1o on a joint aub.mias1on like this.~
These or1 teria., (l) compa.rat1v

na.ge end ,( 2) the .

11vine; ttage . 1.noludina coat of 11vins and tlru.mun. r11,te ,

served

QS

a bas1a for work of the National War Cor.fer-

ence Board 9f World War l e.nd es o ~recedent for all

future boardo.
TheJ~.t1Qllg!l Defense J:1ed1at1on Board

Tho National Defense Med1at1on Board wao created
!n the office or Emergency Management by executive

order on ~ch 19, 1941.

The funotlon of th1s board

wac contained in the last statement-Of the President ' "

exeoutivo ol'ller creating it.
stoppages and lockouts."

-·-------

'l1b1<.\. , p. 220.

8Ibld. , P• 91.

It was "to avoid strikes ,

This objective was pursued

l?
directly by the preventive technique of furthering

sound collective bargainlug. a.osuming that an agreement
1111ngly reached ls .cnor-e enduring than one prOl:lpted
by influence of any kind.

This was a tripartite board

composed of eleven members of

h1eh three were fro~ the

public, four from the employees and four from the

employsrs.

S1tue.t1ona aroce 1n four cases that neoose1tated
the Pr sldent •s intervention.

fhc first case was that

dealing with North Amer1coo Av1at1on, Incorporated.
where the union called a strike during mediat!on 1n
v1olnt1on of an agreement with the board.9
'Iho next eace

as that of Air Assoo1ates, Incorporated~

Tb.is company refused to accept the Board ' s reoommendc.t1ona . and the plants of both oompa.n1es were taken over
by the Army.

The Federnl Shipbuilding and Drydock

Co.mps.ny also rejected the Board' s recommendation and TI'e.s
the third and final company to be seized, th1s time bJ
the Knvy. 11 The fourth oa.se was the short but cr1t1cal

9National Defense F1ad1at1on Board, Report , Volume l ,

Soctlon 23, u. s. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S.
Department of I&bor, 1955, p. 714.
lOib,M!.

llibid.
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strike in the Captive Coal Plines. 12 The President
supported the board 1n refusing a union shop clause.
The eventuality of compulsion, taking over the plants
by the A:rrq and the Bavy, neoessar1ly formed a back-

ground for all of the board • s work.

However,

many

efforts were tr1ed to promote a workable agreement
between tho parties because only then could the full
productive capacity of 1ndustr1 be. released.
In the cases oert1f1ed to the Board 1n the first

six months , approximately three-fourths of them involved a demand With respect to wages. 1 3 The board

was reluota.nt to recommend rates of pay.

It had little

occasion to consider th& relevancy of a living wage as
a cr1ter1on for f1x1ng wage rates.

The number of oases

settled by an agreement seems to indicate that the poor
financial cond1t1on of the employer might lessen the
pressure for a solution which would othern1se seem appropriate.

In the North American AV1at1on oase, the

Board was instrumental 1n raising the general wage
12Ib1d.

lJAbraham L. Gltlow, Wa5e Determ1Lt1on Under National Boards (New York, Prent1oe-Hal , Inc . • 1953) ,
p. 119.
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level. l 4

It argued a bout the large profits of the

1nduatry and pointed out that the present minimum was
much lower than 1n the body and the motor plants of
the automobile industry.

The panel admitted that the

wages at North American were not substantiall7 out or
line with those of other west coast aviation plants.

but 1t believed that 1n view of the enormous importance
of airplanes in National Defense . the wage level 1n
this comparatively new industry should be brought to
the level of wages in the more h1ghl1 pald industries
with whioh airplanes were comparable, such as steel and

motors.

The panel felt that the wage should be suoh as

to ettract and hold the best workers 1n the area.
The government author1t1es brought pressure upon
employers and employees for uniform wage standards and
abol1t1on of strikes .

The oomplet1on of plans for stab1•

11zat1on or labor relations 1n the shipbuilding industry
through the adoption of the Master Agreements bJ regions,

aooord1ng to chairman Dykstra of the Nat1onal Defense
Med1at1on Board, marked one of the most important steps
1n the history of labor relations 1n the United States.

141bid. , p. 120.

-
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This agreement was accepted and put into effect throughout the entire industry with the exoept1on of the
Bethleham Steel Company •a plants.

The Board oons1dered

its recommendations that Bethleham steel become a party
to the Masters Agreement as an appropriate measure to
further the interest of the Federal Government 1n aeour1ng un1form1ty and stab111ty.

The work of the National Defense Mediation Board
olearly shows that the Board did not operate under formulated pr1nc1ples end that 1ts d1spos1t1on of one case
d,.d not serve as a precedent 1n another.

There was even

a resolution by the board to that effeot.

The pr1no1•

ple3 of tripartite representation used by the Board

failed to funct1cn satisfactorily.

Tha Board members

representing the Congress of Industr1cl Organizations
(CIO) restgned as a result of the decision 1n the captive
Coal Mine Case and, although the President refused to

ae-oept their resignation, th1s was the end
of th!.s Board,

or the work

The failure of th!fl Board was due to

several ma.Jor defects.

First , it was given a d1spute-

settl1ng funot1on with 1nsuftle1ent original pouer.
second~ the board dld not establish a policy ao a guide
1n settling d1sputes.

Th1rd, the board ' s personnel

21

seemed well su.1ted to carry out 1nvest1gat1ve and recommendatory , but not mediatory functions.

Fourth. board

members tried to carry on their regular duties 1n add1•
t1on to serving on the Board. 1 5
The Nnt,.onal War La.bor Board--World War II

on January 12. 1942, the President of the United

states , es a result or war and fa1lure or the Med1at1on
Board created, by execut1ve order, the National War Labor
Board.~ Thls new Board took over not only all or the un-

f1n1ehed work

or

the Mediation Board, but accepted as a

basis for ,. ts work tnos same prJ.nc1ples of tr1part1 te

representation.
Th1s Board uas composed of twelve members appointed
by tho Pres1dent.

nrenty-four associate members (panel)

,1ere appointed and autllor1zed to act as mediators 1n any

lab0r d1spute pursuant to the d1rect1on of the Board.
The el'la.1rman might refer any case to one or more asao-

o1ate members (panel) uho should then proceed ~o mediate
1t 1n ~ooordance with the rules of procedure presoribed

-

l5Ib1d. , p. 118.

*see Append1x - Executive orders Relating to the
National war Labor Board.
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by

the Board.

Fach member was allowed one vote and

the majority rule prevailed always, but all deo1s1ons
of the panel were subject to appeal to the Board.

In succeeding to the duties of the eleven-member
National Defense Med.1at1on Board, the twelve-member

National War Iabor Board oooup1ed a stronger position
than its predecessor 1n thsse chief respects,

l) The now Board had behind it an employer-union
pledge ae;ainst work stoppages, whereas. the
old Board had found 1t necessary to request

continuation or resumption of work pursuant
to a statement ln an executive order that it
was the duty of all parties to refrain from
1nterrupt1on orproduct1on.

2) The new Board was d1reoted to settle disputes
by prescribing arb1trat1on; tho old Board was
er.ipo1·1ered merely to use arbi trat1on w1 th oon-

sent of the parties.
J)

Tho new Board was directed to make final determination of dlSJ)Utess the old Board had been
author1~ed to make ever1 reasonable effort to

settle disputes and, if suocessful. , to make
findings and reoommendat1ons.

4) The new Board could take Jur1sd1ot1on of disputes on its own 1n1t1at1ve1 under the previous proeedure. certifica.tlon by the Secretary

or

Labor was a prerequ1s1te.

The executive order by which the National War Labor
Board was created made 1t clear that the effa~t or the

dispute upon the war effort and not the subjeot matter
or the dispute was to be the criterion wh1oh determined

the Board •s lur1sd1ot1on.

The executive order stated

that there should be no interruption of any work which

oontr1b1.ited to the eff ect1ve prosecution or the war.

At first , this was interpreted as giving the Board ,1ur1sd1et1on only over those oases affecting the production
or war mater1al . but the Board gradually extended 1ts

powers to 1nolude all large industries.

A threatened

strike by all unions against a large emplo7ing f1rm
which d1d not produce Far uter1al nor have any govern-

ment oontrsots was held to be a labor dispute W1th1n the
Jurisdiction of the Board because or the poas1ble re-

percussions in war 1ndustr1es.

16

16war labor Reports, Volume 1 , p. 280 (The Montgomer7
Ward com~ case).

Uhatever doubt IJaY have ex!sted on the question
or whothor tho War labor Board waa a spec1es of "SUpreme
Co1trt of Labor ReJ.ations" was largely destroyed by
three do~;-elopmenta.

The '!'oledo, Peor1a. and Western

Bs.1lr'oa.d Company defied the Board ' s order to arb1trate

and the P:-e31dent 1mmed.1atel;r seized the company.

Also,

some employers trere forced t.o s1gn suggested agreements,
to ·rhieh they had. objected• on the grotulds that it m1ght

ron~ler them 11abla to prosocut1on under antitrust laws,

Again, the Board reoommended the discharge of a union
leador tr.ho had participated in a slowdown and a strike,,

The No.t1o.u.al Labor Relations Board often came 1nto
oonflict nlth the Nat101lal War tabor Board.

The dec1-

s1ons of ".;he latter were always f1na1 1n coses relating

to the successful proneout1on

or

the war, whether said

oases concerned labor, transportation or production.

On

ootobsr 3. 1942, by an oxoout1ve order , the President
gave 3u,:01sd1et1on to the Board. over wages and. salaries.•

In the Postal Telegraph company Case . the Board
unani~ouoly refuaed to take jur1sd1ct1on because

or

a

b1n<ilng contraot that coUld be altered on1y with the

-------

..see Apper..d.1~ B .. PI·oV1d1ns for the stabilization

or the National Economy~

25
mutual consent of the partios. 1 7 The Boe.rd oons1s~

tently folloued this pr1no1p1e !n dealing w1th contracts j_n force .

After the Board took jur1sd.1ct1on,

1t could use medint1o.~, ~oluntary arbitration, or

oompuieory arbitration an~ was empowered to settle
the dispute.
The Board had tt!o •' Vital powers:
Withhold eontraets or

tt could

ri.11~.ne;s e.t'.d (2~ 1t could sci

d1spos!t1011. of disputes.

fl) 1 t could

enf 01·ce its pr1or1 ty

plants or mo.ke final

These were negative sanot1ons

and placed the Board in :;, very difficult pos1tion1 the

duty of the Board ~-as to see that there

as no !nter-

rt!.ption of work on wai" produots.
The summary cr.arnoter of' sanct1ons which might be

applied 11ao described tn general terms 1n the Board's
first dec1s1on. 18 A number of fishing boat owners

had at first refused to comply with the Board ' s order

to resume operations ponding a dac1s1ou on the merits
of the caso.

The Board saids

17Thid. , p. SJ. (Postal Telegraph Co~pany caae}
18Ie.bor Relat1ons Reporter (Federated Fishing

Boats) . Volume 9. pp. 688~89.
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Unless the emplo1ers involved comply
With the decisions of the Hat1onal
War Labor Board, their defiance of
said board must be repudiated by all
patriotic Americans and challenged
by whatever forces of government may
be naoessary to obta1n ooopl1ancei9
The Bos.rd also stated 1n the Federal 3h1pbu1ld1ng and
Dry

Dock Case:
Th!a ohallenge is d1reoted not so
.muoh to this board as to the powers
of the Chief Executive of a democracy and the Co.!IIJllander-1n-dh1ef of tha
Army and Na:vy 1n the midst of total
uar. OUr Congr-ess, ou.r' oourts . and
our history mak'e the answer that our
demooracy oan lawfully make war to
cave our demooracy.20

W1th these negative canct1on~ . namely, withholding con--

tracts , t e.1':1ng over plants, and enforc1~ priority rul,.ngs , tlie Board met 1ts problems w1th ~arying degrees

of success.

l'

It 'Fas 1nev1 table that wages would furnish the most

ser1ou.s pr oblem over which the Board would be oallod upon
to establish prinoiples.

Much

or the suocess of

manage-

ment depends upon the aocuraoy with which wagos are ad•

justed to the performance and duties of workers, and 1t

-----l9Ib!.d,

20!b1d. • • (Fader.al Sh1pbu1ld1ng and Drydook Company
Case) Volume 10, p. 339.
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ls the greatest single factor 1n tb.e purohas1ng p0t1er
wh1oh represents oonsumer demand.

Thls Board, unlike

1t' o prodecoasor . ~ormulated def1n1te prlnc1plos on

the question of r.ages.

In one pe.rt1oular case , that

of Little Steel, the cost ~r ~1v1ng was tho Board ' s
determining factor 1n grent1ng a wage 1noroaao. 21 ~he
panol favorod the proposed dollar-a-day lnerease, on
the ground.a or the oompal'J1' 1 t;t ability to pa7. but the
~ d gre.nted cml.7 forty-four oontc a d.aV increase to
keop paoe 1:11 th tho r1alng oost of 11ving.

In othor coaeo , tho pi:.-of1ts of the oompanica 1nvolwd, or thc1r ab1l1ty to pay, was the doo1d.1ns f'ao-

tor favoring a ue.ge 1norease.

few oases d.otermtned
by the Board on the baals of profits followa 22 In tho
A

Morse ~1st Drill and Maohine Conpany Case
of nine oonts an hour

't1BS

Q?l

1norease

granted; ln the International

Ha.rvoater Compalli' Case. tho 25, 000 workors were granted
a four and ona-half cents en hour inaroase: for tho
same reason, a twenty.five oente a day 1norease wao
el.le; ad the emplo;rees of the St. Louis Smoltlng D1v1-

s1cm end Refinlns Company. and tha R.angcr ilroraft

21.tabor Rolstlons Beporter , pp. 324-325.

-

22 Ib1d.
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Engineers D1V1s1on was ordered to make an upward ad•
juatnent or ten oente en hour.
The ablllty to pay tras not the determining tao-

tor ho-aever • when wages needed to be equalized.

Board granted a

11age

Tho

increase 1n two caso 1n wh1oh

the enployera oa1nta1ned that they wera unable to meet

mich !nor eaeod coats.

The equal1z1ng wage was granted,

nevertheless, ln both instances to prevent excose1ve
I

labor turnover.

One of the employers who had been

oper a.ting et e. l0t1 f()r wolva yoara was cl.so directed
to srant a. t1age 1norease.

This 1ncreose was granted

to pt·ovent looa of skilled workrJen 1n a field that had

been deemed an esaGnt1al aot1vicy by the Off1oc of
C

fense Tronsportat1on.

Th1c o~f1ce wns then asked

to do tihat 1t oould to prOVido moro business for the

employers.
Tl-ie National We.r. Labor Board cons1otently granted
•

l

rato 1ncroosoo 1n order to unify t~ge standards n1th1n
definite economic areas.

Where a union sought a was

!.noree.so based on the pol1oy

or

unifying

standards within

the industry and the employer baaed h1s oppos1t1on to the

.

.

wage increac.e one desire to prevent tho unaottl1ng of an

equilibrium as among the different unions wlth which

29
he dealt , the Board chose to support the co.i;npany •s
pos1t1on.

The reason was that the unsettling

or

the

equ111br1wn would be apt to interfere w1th produot1on.
The Board narrowed the North-South d1ffercnt1al
I

•

1n the plants of th.e AlumJ.num company of A.merlca Qlld
ordered nigtit shift bonuses tor 1ts Kensington,
Pennsy1van1~ plant. 23 It was tha pol1cJ of the Board

to grant uage increases whenever and vhorever poss1b1e ,
based on the o ~•s ab111t1' to pay and to keep pace

with the r!.s1ng cost of 11v1ns.

The Board believed

that the increased purohasing power . with its 1nf'la•

t1on&y tendenoes , ehould bo drained off or controlled
through other agenotes.

To provide for the ato.b1lizat1on or tho nat1bnal
eooncmy,, an · e-'ccut1vo order was
lf!sued. October 3, 1942.
.
ostnb11sh1ng tho Office of Economic Bte.b111zat1on. Tho
:w ar Labor Board could not approve s:/J.Y 1norease 1n was

ratea pr6vall~ng on September 15, 1942. unless suoh lnO+OOSC;,lS

i,ere ne~essari to oorroot malnd3uetmente or 1n-

equeJJ.t1ev , to o11m1nato sub-standards or .living, to

corr ect grODB 1nequa.11t1ea, or to a1d in the effeotive
pro~ecut1on of tne·wa:r.

-

23 Ibid . •

p.

7•

The Board made two important deo1s1ona. one settling the dispute between the Breeze Corpo~at1on.

Ir..corporated, and the United Automobile Workers,

cro,

and the othor dispute was between thG Chaso Brass

e.nd Copper Company and the International Assooiation
24 Orders providing tor standaro f !a.oh1nists, AFL.
d1z1ne; wage rates !.n each or these two pl.ante were

~esie;ned to make sure that workers sitting s1de-bys1dc and doing the same work uith the same skill re-

ceived the same~-

Tho Board was left a w1~e ra,nae

in wh1oh to work when the President issued the order
of October

3, 1942 • otab111zing the national economy.

Perhaps tho gr~tl~f:1t advantage th9.t the War Labor
'oq:
Boa.T d· had was that the National Defense Med1at1o~

Board had explored

.many

of the problems

e.nd

this served

ae a basis for the War I.abar Board ' s work .and for the

ttork of futur~ boards.

The Htm? Stab111zat1on Board•-Korean War
The 1nvae1on

or

South Korea by the North Korean

CO!llllluru.sts on June 24, 19.50, brought -war , war brought

1n!'latlon, and 1nf1at1on eventual.17 brought wage and

-

24Ib1d. , P• 179-
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pr1oe controls.

Llke the war • whioh no'bodf wanted.

tho stab1!1zat1on program was unsat1sfaotory to
everyone concerned, 1nclu.d1ng those
otab111zi.ne;. 25

who

'

did the

The maoh1nory !'or the eoonomJ.o otab1l!zation

too countcy

or

was set 1n oot1on as soon as President

Trumn?1 o!.gnod the Defense iroduct1on .A.at .

w.

Stuart

S1I1,\ngton waa llaliled as d.efcnse ooord.1nator to adn1n1s-

ter all controls. defense produot1on, eJ:p3ru31on and
eaono:=l!c nob1llzet1on.
On

'

Soptember 9, 19.50. President Truman issued

e~ocut1ve order 10161 establ1ahJ.ng tho Wage 3tab1l1zat1cn Board.

A section or Part IV or the order read.~ s

There emll be ln the agency a .
Wage s·tab111zat1on Board com-

posed of n1ne mom'bera who snsill
be appolnted by tho .Pres1dent.
Three of ·t he members Go appointed shall be representative
or tabor , and three shlil.1 be ropreoentattve of Business and Induatry. one or the three members i-epreaentµig tho public to be
doaigaated by the P.ros1d.ent, shall
be oha1rman of tho Board.

The We.go

Stab111zat1on Board ohall make reeommondat1ons to the Adlll1n1stra.t1on

250r.mc

w.

Phelps . Introd.sctton to Il.lboi:_ Enonomca
(Ne·.! York, McGrat1-H1U Book company• Incorporated.
1961) , p. 195.
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regarding the planning and development of Wage Stabilization
po1.1c!es and. shall pert~orm suoh

furthe~ £U?lct1ons with respect to

Wage Stab111zat1an as may bo determined by the Administration

af te~ oonmtltation With the Boara. 26

The tr!part1to Board mat and, during the f ollow1ng 11celo:l. :r:o:rked to d&irelop a wa~ stab1l1zat1on

policy.

Tho Bbard held public hearJ.ngs at Which

l abor and management r epr esentat! ves expressed their
view po1nts .

By the terms or the ezeout1ve order•

1016!. , the Board was Olll.y advtsor;, • . The l3oard m.em-

berc, hcr;iever, f elt very stroUgly that tlley shou.J.d

ma.kc o.nd o.dmill!cter pol1cy, aub3eot only to the final
approval

or

the President • . Olff1oult1ea such as th1s

ou.l.~tr..ated in tha res1~t~on

or Eoonom10 stabilizer,

Alb.n Ve..lont1ne . who was succeeded by Erle Johnston.

During this per iod. the Board was l!m1ted to a ste.b1•

lizat1on ~u.n ct1on.

In tMs
. respeot
...,. , 1ta funottons were

juat the opposite

or. the

War !I , trhicb bad

be8'l,Ul

war Laber Board during World

u1th a d1spute-settl1ns f unction.

The early days of the Board were r.:iarltcd by a high
degree of oonourrenoe eJnang 1ta nine member a.

The

Board' a off1cia.l statement was an unan.\mous oxpres-

s1on or the Board' s op1nion.

It reoogniaed t h a t ~

eontrols have e partial role to pl.e.y 1n curbing !.nflat1on !n tho tendency for concru.mor purchaslng pot1er to

lnor easc more re.p1dl7 than the supply

or

consumer goods

and se:rv1oes.
This 1men2 m1ty t1n8 short-11ved.

Organized labor

coon vo1oed 1 ts disapproval of Regulation No. 6
( General Wage Regulo·tton No.. 6 of the 'We&-e Stab111za-

t1 ~ Boo.rd.).

It stated•

Those pol1o1eo a.re desle;ncd to
correct 1neqllit1es as hQ.ve ar1son
because of d1 spa.rt tleo between
1noreaees ln wages and salaries
and the increases 1n the ooot of
living slnoc January 15, 1950, or
~h1oh ~ subsequently a.r1oe during tho 12er1od covered by this
pol1oy.2'/
At tho very start. labor was nlloued to even up

wagos at 10 ~r cent above the January. 19.50, level,
supplementary beneflts, pa.y for holldaye and vaoat1ons

negot!.atcd after Februe.rJ 27, were offset a~1not the
permissible 10 per cent.
27o1t1ow, OP,,., o1t. • PP• 183--184.

The basis for this new policy cocmE to have been,

0Let Prices Spur Produot1on.n

There 11os n general

feeling that short of war. neither labor , business
nor the farmer uould live uith a rigid oe111ng on
thelr t-rages.

The adm1n1strat1on' s plan

UWl

to oonoen-

trate on ma..~imWn prod.uot1on rather than to hold the
11ne.

Erlo Jolmatan sa1d:

0

Regulat!on of prices and

wages must ibe flextble to stimulate prod.uotlon.•
Cyru£: Ching stated:
better than str!koa. 11
sa.1d:

"Regulated ,,ago 1noreaaes are
certain White Rouse Adv1sQrs

.

"fJf..an1pulate prtoeo 1n cuoh a we.y a.a to d1a-

cout""c.ge non-essential output. give inoentive to
essent!als.« 28
To settlo the dispute 1'ollol1lng Ro~t1on 6. tho

Pros!dent establlahed a sevonteen-oember AdV1sory
Doard with Chi.of Nob1ltzer Cnarles E. w11son ao Chalr-

nen.

On_Apr11 21, 1951. the

wase

Stabll1zat1on Board

bec&mo an etghteen..aomber trlpa.rt1te Bo,:ird With

l.1.m1ted

dispute-settlement runot1ons.
The Board could bear d1aputes 1n only two s1tua-

t1ons. First.

1n

a s,:.:ven oe.sG; 1Then ~tles agreo

2Bnr,et Prices Spur Produot1on, n Bua1neoc Week,
ebrUarY ) . 1951 . P• 21.

jointly to subm1t their disputes to the Boa.rd for
rec0l:!tilendat1ons or dec1s1ons, the Board could accept
or re3ect the ease.

lt had no authority to 1nt0r,

vene 1n any case upon 1ts

omi

second. the

motion.

Pro ldent oould refer to the Board a dispute that
substantially threatened the progress of national
defense.

The Board could then mlte 1nveat1e;ations

end recommend equitable terms of aettlement.

on

J~ 8 , 1951, the Boa..-d reStuned 1ts funotion-

,.ng t' 1th George W. Tcylor suooeed1ng Cyr,; s Ch1ng as
Clla1rc::w..

Zn September. 1951. George

su.ccecded by Nathan Fc1ns1nger.

w.

Taylor waa

When the Board wao

reoonst1tu.tod by the Dofenso Produot1on Act 1n 1952,
the Chatman as Archibald Cox.

President

T'ru.mn

over-~rulod the Board 1n tho Bituminous Coal Caso and

cox resigned to be succeeded by Charles c.
K1111naoworth. 29
The reconstituted Bos.rd, shorn

or

jur1sd1ot1on

over labor di!3PUtes, made a strong attoopt to malntal.n
the t~ge stab111ze.t1on progrBill 1n tho coal oase.

The

Prooident •s over ...ru.J.1ng the Board'e dco1e1on cast
•

---------

29~ew York T1meo. Deoember 5, 1952, Ed1tor1al.

J6
considerable doubt upon the Board ' s future l1fe and
author1 ty.

The end came 1n early February• 1953. when

President Eisenhower ended the Board ' s life by
executive order.JO
Th~ National Wage Stab111zat1on Board faeed many
problems not raoed by prev1ous boo.rds.

Flrst or all,

there ~ac the 1mm1nent wage and pr.1ce 1norease 1n
steel.

Blg steel. had sald that an 1norease

or

flfteen

centa an hour for steel workers would neceea1tate $10.00
a ton ·!ncrease 1n prloes.

The steel unl.on •s 1noroased

wages had established a new wage level for mass production employees w1tb other unions then want1ng aa muoh
or more.

W1th1n a matter of months , tho r1ee in steel

prices had been reflected 1n higher pr1oes for oonsumer
goods.

Unions were pushed to make up that loss 1n rco.l

wages resu1t1ng from a r1s1ng cost-of-11v1ng,
1

11v1ng contracts were the anovor.3

Coot-or-

The General Motoro

Automat1a Wage adjuotment formula was oop1od wldely and
covered more than a m1111on workera.

32

30G1tlow • • op. cit. , p. 188.

31Genera1 Wage Regulation, No.

s.

p. 42 . .

32pu.s1ness Week, December 2, 1950, p. 106.

The peoul1ar1ty of the Korean "incident" created
a most compl1ca.ted s1tuation.

There was no all out

war and the apparent a1ght of victory in 1951 took

the urgenoy out of mob1llzat1on and made the Federal
Government heeltate to press labor, the farmer , the

bus1nessman , or the taxpayer too hard • .Prlces. however . continued to rise, the bU11t-1n eost-of-11v1ns
clauses
1n
.

contracts
kopt WQges 1noreas1ng.
The
.
.
stabllleation program had been designed to close the

gap

maJll'

betrreen supply and d~mand, and to .keep prices and

wages steady.

Tbere were

havo been accomplished•

tt10

ways that this could

(1) pcoplo ~onld have spent

leso , o1ther because the money was kept or :was taken
out of their hands • or (2) booause w1ll1ngl.y or uno1111ne;ly they sa.vei more.

It was the Job

or

tne antl-

1nfla.tlon program to see that the gap was closed by tha
first method rather than the aeoon11. 33
Finally. to further oomplloate tho program, the
power of seizure by the President, wh1oh had boen the
force underlying the work of previous Boards, waa held

to be unoonst!tutlonal..34

-

33zb1d.. , i:lrOh 24, 1951, P• 130,

34xoungata.m Shoet and Tubo company, et al. , vs.
sawyer, United states Reports, Volume J43, Ootober Tel'Ill,
19.51.

38
"The exeout1ve order was not authorized by the
oonst1tutlon or ltuts or tile Unlted states. and cannot
atand. 11 35
The V!:_ot ~ 31 tuatton ap.d Price Nage GUidepost

Tile origin or wo.ge-prioa "suidepoot" can

.

back to 1961 and tha KGDnedy Ad.mj.nlatrat1on.

be

traced

.Ba~1oally,

the central ides was to promote full employment by

oxpand.ing federal and private spending.
Full employment oa.t"r1os one lmpor~t risk.

As the

employment rate .r1s&G and business picks up , prlaee
start to rise.

Indeed, lf employment over full. those

price increases aa ~roll as wage inoreases become trtd ..

Dprea~.

Thus , the general level or prlces (measured by
the consumer P.r1ce Index• CPI) r!soo rapidly.J6 With

full employment and rising prices already 1nlt1ated,

labor ncoeasar1ly tends to increase 1ts share , reaultins

ln

U$.g8

increases~

Tho Viet Nam ns1tuat!on 11 has produced 1n Aoerie e
highell stato of full-employment than has existed s1nce

36B!"UCO T. Allen. "The Guidepost, A S:,mpath1o Obltuary, n MSU Busiqess T9P1Qg, 1967. P, ?2.
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the World War II period..

~d. these "gutdeposta•1 were

being used--unauccessfUl.ly or wrongly-as controls. 37

The qua.11ficat1ons which could have made guidepost
:wngos and prices eff1o1ent wases and prices were being

forgotten.
Organj.zed labor had never been happy with the guide-

posts, since they were alleged to hatilper free collective
hverv r,o:t and then. a vase increase would

barG;liru.ng.

exoced tho national trend (for e:mmple . 1964 auto
settlement) • 38 Those increases eventually lead to t_he

A.dm1n1strat1on r cowendattan for retention of lower
general guide rates. lhatevor attention wuons had paid

to thece guideposts now became open def1anoe.
Wh1lo the

11

guldeposts" are couoidered a fo1~ure ,

they have boen somewhat useful beoauae of the lmowledge
gained.

The V1 t Nam S1tuat1on bas fa1lod to tu the

econo:ny tilth t1ar mob1l1mt1on.

Work stoppages. etr1kea.

and lockouts, although t~oy do ex1st . have rot to become

an emergenoy situation.
\

.

.

.

The quost1on still re~1ns to what extent- --..r1ll these.
guldoposts. as uell as National Wage Control Boarda, be

--

J?!bid.

3aE. K. Falkmeyer ~Is tabor ' s Wage Push·Moro Bark

than Bite?" ortune, Li.IX (June, 1964) , l00-10).
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effect!ve if and when the V1et

Nam

Situation beoomeo

"e. war" , and. the real1zat1on chat economic and soc!.al
salvation rests entirely upon wh~ther or not tho econom.1c cr1eis which results can be met.

CHAPTER lV
THE THEORY 0? WAGE CO?ffiiOLS UNO.Im MOBILIZATION

Professor John ltenneth Gal.bralt,- was 1n a favor-

able pos1t!on to expla1n the operations of controls.

Unt!l World War II, he , like some of his oontemporar1as. was not au.re that oontrols wow.d work.

In 1941.

Dr. Galbraith was named OPA Doput7 Administrator 1n

charge of pr1ce controls.

Bo not only had a close look

at .runertoa•s first largo soala controls but also had a

close look at tho operation of controls 1n enemy terrl•
tory as Director

or the United States Strategic Bomt,..:.

1ng SUrvey 1n chE.u'ge or its eoonom.10 work.
The theory of controls ~as divided 1nto two seot1ons.

Tho first dealt tt1th a fully mobilized eoonomv

1.n World 't''ar II.

DUr1ng this per1od of. 1941 to 1943,

controls lfere looked upon and accepted not only as 1nt"la.t10T1..ary control measuros but also as an integral

part of the strategy of resource mob111zat1on.

The

seeor.a.d section dealt with a partially mob111eed aoonomy

!.n tho l{arean r.ar.

The maJor oEJpect 1n thia porlod wa
~

the prevention of a wege•prlce aplral.
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Prior to World War II , economists a.ttaohed very
little 1mportanoe to the role of controls.

Nost of

them would go to the other extrem.e end would deplore
plae1ng e:n:., reliance on pr1oe and wage oontrols.

This

faot was bassd on the baiter that the measures wore
both unw1se and impossible to aeeompl1ah,

These econ-

omists could aeo no good to bo derived from controls

but vere certain of the damage that would 'bE! caused by
th~m.

It was quite ev1dcnt that to control prices

wouJ.d lenve uncontrolled the exoeas or demand that
started the upward movement.

Nothlng useful could be

gained O..'ld inflation would result.

If the purpose

was to balance demand against supply and allocate resou.~ceo. this was the function of freely moving prices.
If prices a.~e flxed , they cannot funet1on freely.
These economists oaw pont1"ols as removing the very
JllQehlnery t1h1oh is moat useful 1n do1ng that wh1eh 1s

required of controls.

They saw oontrols aa caue1ng an
.:,,,.

1mpDoper functioning of the economy.l

1 1.1111am

c. Ferguson,

"An Analysts of the Wage

atab1lizat1an Board's Cr1ter1a 1n Wage Determinat1on, "
Bureau of labor and Management, State un1vers1t1 or
Iowa. 1955, P• 130.

43
The eoonomist felt hew-as on f1rm ground when ho

deemed controls no Ul'llf1se and 1mpoas1ble.

0n the basts

or 0mp1r1ea1 1nformat1on. he tras well supportod.

'.rhere

uore nc attempts at controls or publlc regulations
that could be oo.lled su~ceesful, arJ all attempts had
been l _1 ated as failures. 2

exp1atned,

These failures uero easily

self•1ntarest had al.Waye neeess1tnted a

oool.1t1on bat.ween bUJers and nellers.

This loft oon-

trolo as a measure uaed by the government wlthout the

eons0nt of the gov~rned.
1nto tne only I!lnrket.

A small bl.eek market grew

F1an ~wqs .~ttempts to adjust

h1s cconom1o affairs to preva1111l8, clreumatanoes.
There uere
contcnt!on.

.many

atteopts at controls to OUpJ;>Ort thls

In GerDll3l'J.Y, the pr1oe freeze cf 1936. was

tho result or the pe.o ple •s tear or 1nr1.at1on.

A ban

was placed cm pr1oos beoause there vaa no other a.lternatlve available to the1:1 at tbcs t1me.

In England, the

economy we.s b.,..,okod 1nto tmat was a volunte..r;y sy-atem of
controls.

In Canada, the oontrols were reaul ts of up-

uard cu.rges 1n prloes.

In tho United States, 1n 1941,

an orthodox doslgn tor a war-time polioy ,1as worked
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out.

Taxation together with the control of oonaumer

credit was expected to hold demand 1n balance with

supply.

Controls were to be plaoed onl1 on those

goods 1n either short supply or espeo1ally atrond demand.

Many

soonomtsts saw wage stability ao a b1-

product of price stab111ty.3

The measures as worked out 1n 1941. wero not
very attractive.

Pr1oes =ose very rapidly. tuea were

not suff1c1ent to bring demand in ba~oe w1th supply.

After these measures failed . there wae instituted the
General Maximum Prloe Iiegulatlon of 1942.

This was an

important step in war-time policy and served as a

model for future oontrols.
verced.

The pol1cy of 1941 was t-e-

The new policy undertook to regulate all pr1-

oes en.d not just oerta1n ones as the previous pol1c7
had done.

C1reumatances forced the very step whloh

tho older school of eoonom1sts had vtewed as both unwise and impossible to aocomploah.
Total Nob111zat1on ln World War II
The question of how well controls worked for the
world war II period. is debatable.

It is admitted that

these controls served as temporary measures 1n that
they deferred rathe1· than prevented pr1oe-wage

movements.

Workers durlng the war had been given claims

on future c1v111an goods 1n return for their effort 1n
the manufacture or military goods.
by

These claims held

the workers were 1n banks, in ourre.no7, and 1n

Government bonds, all of nh1cb was readil;r spendable.
When controls were releasc,d, these l1qµ1d claims had
the tendency to br1ng ba inflation.
T.o the extent that oontrols held down inflation

during the war , they were neither unwise nor impossible
to administer.

The adm1nlstrator, however , had many

d1ffioult problems to overcome.

To ed.m1n1ster oontrol

is to work hardships and damage on the fortunes of

1n~1v1duals 1n an absolute sense or at least 1n ralat1on to opportUh1ty.

People must be denied 1ncomo they

have had or could have had.

in the operat1on

or

a free

When these th1nga happen

market, no one ls to bl.em.

The des1re for money and the desire for re-eleotion to
office are too very powerful motives and the adm1n1stra•
tor had to contend with or even deny the aspirations of
both.
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The Poet-War Period

Controls were just as ineffective 1n the postwar
period as they were offeot1ve dur1ng the war years.

The reasons for this 1neffeot1veness a:ro raadlly

dlcoern1ble.

At tho end or ~he war , tnxcs were re~

d.uoed immediately end very substantially.

consumers

borrowed frCl.lrl current revenues and frQ:11 59V1ngs.

A

government • s public work program, as great as anything
undertaken during ths depression, was started s®n

after the close of the war.

Direct oontrols over re•

soux-ae use ~ere quickl.7 decontrolled.

Price control

soon folloned all of the other oonvers1on to oiT1l1en
goods lm.s htLrdly completed and 1nventor1es·were at1ll
seriously short.

W1th these ex1st1ne.; oondlt1ona ,

yea.re of accumulated demand were released.

Just as im-

portant o eolll'se 1n the 1neffeot1venoss of oontrola waa
a lack or underotand1ng of tho problem.

Lcedersh1p to rid the country of controls -.manssum.ed by the Nat1onal Assoo1at1on of Manufacturers, who
prom1sed that there would be no 1nflat1on.

There were

othora who wanted an 1mmsdiato end to controlc out of

rear that lf" allowed to eont1nue , the7 might last 1n•

def1nitel1.

some even felt that controls would hinder

production.

These reasons uere given 1n view or the

fact that the greatest eXpans1on of produot1on in the

nat1on•s history ooou.red under controls and that the
economy was operating rUrlder a state

or

full emploJ111ent. 4

A coupl more rears of high taxes .
of reatra1nt en private borrowing,
and of gradually relanng oontrols
m1ght well hove been surr101ent ror

stab1l1ty and would have been a sl1ght
oonsequance or the largest effort 1n
eoonon1c moc1l1zat1on that any nation
ever attempted. Important men 1ns1sted that 1t be otherw1se. i:rne do'IU'
gods who kopt watch on eoonomlo pol107
muat muse at the way American Cap1tal.iBIIl ls abugcd by its most vooal ·
de!'enders.~

-

-

Partial Mob1lieat1on in the Korean ~or

The d1sequ1l1br1um sy~tem of controls ao used in

world war II was qu1te different from those controls
used !n the Korean War.

In the former instance , ol.1

measures were subordinated to the major task
plete mob1U.zat1on.

or

oom-

The latter had tho main purpose

atab111z1ng the eoonom,. where thei•e

as a much smaller

SJohn Kenneth Galbraith , A Theory of Prloe ConHarvard on1vers1ty Preso, 1952) , pp.

.t!:Ql (tambr1dge;

33~.58.
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percentages of material going into defense use.

Th1a

resulted 1n 1111l1ted controls over materials , plants ,
and manpower.

There was 11m1ted mob111zat1on and many

1ndiv1duale and groups ma.de demands fo-: equitable

claims on ineo:ne or property.

Unl1ke World War II

reg-..tlat1ons, there was no complete surrender or 1nd1v1dual pref~rences.

There were no pro.mises g1ven

against futuro goods, beca,ise there was no foreseeable

term.2.nat,.on point.

There wo.s faint hope that there

could be mob111zat1on without arq of 1ts acccmpany1ng

inconveniences.
ln World War II, there were restra1nto 1n operation.

Manageoent felt that labor was always wro.t1g and

that the demands of labor were opposed to the best .interest of both businesses and of the soc1 ty.

Another re-

straint wa.~ that tne end of the war vas foreseen and
that there would be a reokon1ng dey for those oompanles
that had allowed wages or prices to go too h1gh.

These

restraL~ts were inoperative during the Korean Conflict.
Labo?· was regarded in a different perspeet1ve and tfages
were gen~z·e.llv increased as labor demanded.

The d1aequ.111br1um system of World War II offered

as an 1ncent1vo va.lue , money claims on future goods.

In

the Korean War resources were only part1all7 mob1Uced.
goods and services or nearly all k1nds were available
tor consumers all throughout the war.

The raoe tracks

were open and other goods alao were available, so that
much of the excess demand was drained off through these
soU!'ces.

Controls under partial mob111zat1on operated

under oond1t1ons of eqU111br1um or supply and deL:!alld.

The function or theso controls was necessary only in
markets of 1mperfeot oompet1t1on and 'became less a
probleo as the markets approaohed pure o~et1t1on.

Wage controls were necessarily oonf1ned to thoso wages
wh1eh were determined b7 oolloctive barga1n1ng between

strone; union.a and strong firms.
Either by accident or by des1e:,n, the controls or
the Wage Stab111zat1on Board followed closely this
problem.

These controls were most effective in those

areas where colleot1ve bargaining was tho rule.

In

most tnstanaes uhere there was an approaoh to pure
compet1t1on. unorganized employers of farmers and small
f1rms were exempt from controls.

wore those exero1sed by demand.

The only restraints

However , lt was un-

llkely that oontrole would ever be so arranged by deelgn.

In most economic reasoning, 1t has become generally
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aooepted that controls must have general appl1oat1on.
It was difficult to leave uncontrolled auoh oost-or,

11v1ng 1 tems as food and oloth1ng. and then try to

explaln to union leaders why wages were f1xed , also
prof its . and agricultural pr1oes were controlled only
by 1nd1rect means.

Ul'lder certain conditions. the oompet1t1ve markets
may have a d1sequ111brat1ng efreot.

They may draw

r esources ... from other markets and may have to be treated
in general re~tions.

If 1nflat1on control 1G suo-

coeaful . there will be , at least oocas1onally, below
oe111n.g prices. and shortages on any large scale u111
serve as a serious warning.

It 1s thd.s eompet1t1ve

msrket which tells 1f demand 1s belns kopt 1n ba.lanco
w1th supply. 1f controls, under partial mob111zat1on,
arc effective or not.

In January, 1951, drast1o action nas taken to
stop the runaway of salaries and wages, stopped a chaot1e movement but 1 t also froze Jil8D7 1nequ1tie a.

The

Wage Stab111zet1on Board ' o f1rst major taok waa to

develop a polioJ to oorreot inequities, to create
order had developed.

The rcgUlat1ons

ere emergency

measures n1med at bringing price and wage movements
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to a halt. and to gtve the Administrat1on time to

develop an equitable control program.
Viet ~M Mob111zat1op

Now that Vlot Nan represents a oompletel~ new type

of mob111zat1on. a nett approach to wage controls 10
applied.

The wage o.nd price guideposts, altheugh oon-

s1dcred a. f a1lure • 6 have presente.d a valuable lesson.
'

This lesson is that o form or cODtrol designed under
one set of circumstances ls 1rrelavent under soma other
emergency e1tuat1on.

The Amer1oan economy. 1n a tJ.me or a modern licited
war . la mthout tho necessary controla to head off 1noreeoed wages and lo not able to effeGt1vely control
th

1nfle.t1on that results.

The Office of <:1v11 and

Defcnr:e Mob1U.eation 1s no doubt a form of oont1·0l, bUt
1s rendered lncffect1ve because the country 1teelf 1s

ln no tmmediate clangor from war or tht'eat of war.
Th0 Viet Nam S1tuat1on remains.

Yet!

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CO~CWSIONS
SUmco.ri

In an economy already operating at peak levels

of produotlon and employment , how much Mg1ven is there

1n a labor foroo ·co meet the demt.Lnds of en emorgency
such as war or near war.

careful system of plans

muot be developed and. utilized to economize the resour coo and manpower of the nation.
In the past emergeno1es , a certain port1on of the

overall manpower for etaff1ng defense plants oons1ated
of 'tiorkero already on the job.

In some 1ndustr1ec, an

automatic st1!tch from consumer goods to defense product1on aeoompllshed this task.

A resulting p1noh ln

o1v111an type industries. suoh es constructlon. hnd the
effect of n:ek1ng additional employees availablo 1n the

production of defense goods.
The growth and cpread of !ndustr7-w1do labor unions
has ,.ncreo.sed the power an~ prestige of tm1ons and allowed them to develop att1 tud.ea for the1:r organization

~d regul~tc, tn part. the lives of m1ll1ons.

Either
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d1re~tly or ind!reotly, there are a few actlv1tles

nr-

!ecting ~ages , hours and cond.1t1ons of employment that

aro not dlaeuocod in colleot1ve barga1?U.ng,

A clear understanding o~ tho above s1tuat1on and
1 ta economic 1mpl!.cat1ons oonoernJ.ng wages wtll help
to produce o meeting of the m1nda and prevent lookouts
and otr1kec.

It nlll also help to prevent inflation.

ond t'7111 aid in tho smooth effect1ve proaecutton or

Ib.ny labor dift'1oult1ea. wh!oh impede war produc. '.
tion, marked tho early period of the United States• part1o1pat1on in previouo 11ars.

Tb1s was part1e.ll1 due to

the lack or" a ocntral.1zed ~01101 and reap~ns1b1l1ty ln
dealing t,1 th labor problems.

cte a 1n labor pol1o1es

or

There were 1noone1 aton-

different govermient depa.rt-

monto and., of ten, there were differences botwoen bureauo
of the ssme department.

Uagoo oonst1tuted the maJor issue oomlns before
the Wo.r labor Board in worl.d liar X being involved !.n

:more then half of the canes.

Tho war Labor Board stresoed

the necees1tJ ~or grading of positions on the basis of
~ut1eo and respons1b111tle~ 1n ord~r to la;r a foundation

tor eqw~table ewcrda.
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Situations arose in four oases prooesscd by tho

National Defense Med1at1on Boa.rd during the Pre-World
War II perlod that naoesa1tated the Preo1dent •s inter-

vention.

The eventual taking over or defense plant~

ty the Army and Navy• neeessarily formed a background

to o.11 ~r the Board ' s work.

However, many efforto

were tried to promote a workable agreement between tho
part1os because only then could the full produot1ve

capacity of induatrv be released.
Tho work of the National Dafense Mecllat1on Boa.rd
ele&>.rly shows that the Board did not operate under

formulated pr1nc1ples and that its dlspos1t1on or one
case did not neoessar117 serve as a precedent 1n another.
Tho executive order by wb1oh the National War Labor
Boa.rd i'7a.s ci.·eated made !.t olear that .the effeot of tho

dispute upon the war effort rather than the subject matter of the dispute was to be the or1ter1on which de-

termined the Board t s Jur1sd!otion.
v!.tel "poners,

The Board had two

(l) 1t could withhold the contracts or

it could en.foroe its pr!or1ty rultngs, and (2) lt ooul~

make final d1spo,1t!on of the cilsPutes or it could

ae!ze plants.
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In other oases. the prof1ts or the 0014pan1es involved or their ab1l1ty to pay was the deo1d1ng factor
f avor1ng we.ge 1norcases.

Tlle ab1l1ty to pay wae not

the deterc1m.~ t'actor . however. when wages neodod to
be equolit:ed.

The :eoard granted a wage increase 1n

two caeee 1n which the employers .malntalned. that they

were UllS.ble to meet au.oh 1noreqsod ooats,
Perhaps the greatest advantage
Boar d p o aesoed l'l"aa

that the War Labor

that the Dat1onal Def ense t1ediat1on

Board md. explored· many of the problems wh1oh servod as
. ba.als f or the work of the Wau- Labor Board and t'or thi,
wor lt of

ru.tUre

board a.

Under t,ne broad powera of tllo Defense Production

Act of 19Sl . the Pree1dent was authorized to xero1se

control over cred1t. produGtion. and clistr1but1on or
ma.torlal.s .

He had the power to fix o ilinss on wae,-ea

and pr 1ces and to ration consumer goodo.

0-~t or th1o

Defense Procluct1on Act grew the Wage Stab111ze.t1on
Boa.rd.

This Board was ended by President Eisenhower 1n

early February, 195J.
The pecul1a:r.1ty of tho Korean War created a moat
ooI:lpllcatcd sttuat1on.

Thero was no ail-out war and

the eppa?:"ent etgbt of victory in 19.51. took tho urgency
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out

or

mob111zat1on and made the Federal Governmm,t

hesitate to press labor , the farmer . the businessman,

or the tal': payer too hard.
Stab111:zat1on was an easent1al 1ngred1ent of the
def ense mob1l1zat1on program.
a part of the total

It was , of course. only

program but a highly essential

pa.rt .

The Off ice of C1V1l Defense Mob111zat1on repre-

senta a t ype or control to ba ut111zed 1n the event or
m1l1 tar

attack upon the united States 4

an 1m:ied1ate

The V1et

11

In suoh a case,

freeze" or prices and wages woUld result.
~

S1tuatlon does not represent nor dooa

1t seem poss1ble or res-al.ting 1n an attaok upon tho
United States, thereb1. rendering those Elmergenc;y oon-

trolo 1nerreot1vo and non...appl1cable 1n tb1s present
state of llm1ted mob1l1~at1on.
Conolus1ons
..,.__.
-•-"T.. ...
I

Freedom or eoono!i11c act1on 1s a oharaatar1st1c
of free voc1ety.

When, however . such a nat1on ls foroed

into a state of cmergenoy by armed aggression in tha

world . tbe public interest intervenes 1n eeonomc dec1o1ons and some temporary 11m1ts have to ba placed
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arpu.nd freedom or aot1on.

A set of emergency rules

has to be drawn up by wh1oh everybody 1s expected to

ab1de.
Wage different1ala are a part or eoonom1o and

bua!nccs term1nolos,.

Ineq~ t1es and 1nequ1ties have

paycholog1cal end more connotations.

In the soo1al and

moral oode of e nation built on egqlitor!an trad1t1ons
the do.oline of equal-pa;y for equal-uork 1s deeply rooted.

Tho 1n1t1al pol1o1es of a atab1l1zat1on program are

likely tc be be.ckward...look1~ policies.

Stab111zat1on

alao has a pos1t1ve meaning. · It operates 1n a context
or ehan.g1ns econom1e forces and o1roumstanoea, in wh1oh
the a..."'lt1-!.nflat1on aspect must be allied with the drives

f or increased production

or

es~ent!al

goods

and oerV1ces.

In the American eoono.lilY' and rx:u-tioularly during an
emergency period, high level productton is a baalo goal.

Produot1V'.1ty plays a baa1o role 1n total produotion
trends and produot1on potential.

inerea~ed, some advanoe in wages

Whon produet1vi t1 1s
may be

needed to at-

traot men from other oocupat1ons, industries and plaoes
into the oi:pand1ns plant or industry.

Whatever recommendat1ons

~

be made as to future

wage-~ett1ng or1ter1a must largely be determined by the
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type or the eme~genoy.

In an all-out emergency • .ca-

ter~.a.ls . manpouGr . pr1ces and wages should be allooated
by s:n overAU Board.

Jor ld War II.

This 1s what happened during

Unde:i.· th1o s1tuation. emphasis uao plaoed

upon pr oduetion.

ill activities of th econooy uero

worked 1•ith!n the framework of the total emergency.

Ceil i ngs wer e plseed on pricos end wages . and essent1al
goods were r ationed.

Taxes were increased and ever7

ffort ua.s mad to increase the sale of defense bondc
f or t he purpose of drawing aurplus funds from the mar-

ket .

In the future , u."1.der s1m1lar s1t,"Uat1ona, th1a

should be the ga1.d1ng prino1.ple 1n eatabl1sh1ng a

pol1cy .
In e. partially mob1l1zed

oonomy. -~he immediate

conomic s1taet1on would be more serioua because of the

attitude or Ame~1cans toward governmental interference
w!th their llves except 1n times of total ooersencteo.
It wou.ld be more d.1ffioult to prevent 1.mtled1a.te infla~
tlon.

I t 1 8 difficult f or any business to r~al1zc or

to r estr ain a suooetesful operation even i f suoh might

be detr 1~ental to the overall economy.

It 10 d1ff1cult

to aecomplish a positive purpose with only negntlve

sanctions operating as restraints.
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The democrat1c pr1nc1ple of tr1part1te rapresenta.t1on, the wage ...freeze . and the cost-of-11V1ng
or1tcr!.on have all worked well 1n emergano1es and oan
be

e~ected to do as much 1.n the future emergencies.
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APPIIIDICBS

APPENDIX A
GENmuI, DOCUMENTS
EXECUTIVE ORDERS BELA.TING TO THE NATIONAL WAR

LABOR BOARD
Exeout1ve Order No. 9017
January 12, 1942
Whereas by reason or the stato of war de~
olared to exist by Jo1nt resolutions of the Congroos,
approved December 8, 1941, and December 11, 1941, respectivel7, (Publ1o Iaws Numbers J28, j)l , J32-77th

Congress) , the national interest demands that there
shall be no 1ntorruption of 8111 work ffhich contributes
to thG effoot1ve proseoutlon

or the ~ar: and

Uhereas as a result of a conference of representatives of labor and industry which met at the

call or the President on December 17, 1941, 1t has
been agreed that for the duration

or tho war. there

shall be no strikes or lookouts, and that'all lo'bor
d1sputes she.11 be settl'3<1 by peaoeful means , and that
a National \'Jar Labor .B04rd be established for the
peaeefttl adjustment of auoh d1sputoa,

2

Now. therefore . by vlrtue of the authority
vested 10 me by the Constitution and the statutes or
the United States. 1t 1e hereby ordered,

1.

There ls hereby oreated in the 0ff1oe

f' or EmergenoJ Management a National War Labor B~·c:. ,

hereinafter referred to as the Board.

The Board shcul

be composed of twelve apec1el oomm1ss1onera to be
appointed by the President.

Four of the members shall

be representatives of the publloa four shall 'be representatives of employees, and four shall be representatives of employers.

The President shall designate the

Chalrman and Vice-Chairman of the Board from the
members representing the publ1o~

The President sho.11

appoint four alternate members representatlve

or

1

em-

ployees and four representative of employers, to servo
as board members 1n the absence or regular members
representative of their respective groups.

Six members

or alternate members, 1nol.ud1ng not less than two members frOlll each of the groups represented on the Board,

shall oonat1tute a quorum. A vaoanc7 1n the Board shall
not 1mpo1r the right of the remaining members to exer-

o1se all the poffers of the Board.
2. Th1a order does not sppl7 to labor d1sputoa for wh1oh prooedures for adJustm.ent or settlement

3

are othel'lf1se prov1ded until those procedures have

been e~uated.

3. The prooedures for adjusting

and settl-

1ng labor d1sputeo Which might interrupt work wh1oh

eontr1butes to the erreot1ve proseout1on or tho war
olla.ll be as followoa

(a) The parties shall first

r sort to d1reot negot1at1ons or to the procedures
provided 1n a oolleet1v

barga1n1ng agreement.

(b)

If not settled 1n thls manner , the comm1se1oncra or
conc111at1on or th Dopartmont of Labor ehall be notlf led 1f they have not already intervened 1n the d.10-

pute.

(c) If not properly oettled bJ oonc111at1on,

the Secretary of labor shall oort1fJ the dispute to
the Bocird, prov1ded. houave:r , that the Board 1n 1ts

desorat1on after consul.tat1on n1th the secretary m1
take jur1ad1ot1on of the dispute on 1ts om motion.

After it takes jur1sd1ot1on, the Board ahall r1na111
d term.no the dlepute. nnd for tho purpose may uefl

mediation. voluntary arb1tra.t1on, or arb1tratl.on under

rules established by the Board.
4. The Board shall nave pouer t.-o prooulgate
ruleo a.ncl rcgulat1ona appropriate for the performance
of lto duties.

4

5. The members of

the Board (1nolud1ng

alternates) Gball receive necessary traveling expenses . and unloss their oompasat1on ls otherwise pre•

scribed by the Pres1dent . shall receive ln addition
to tr veling expenses

25 per d1em. r or subs1stenoe

expense on suoh days as the1 a.re nctuall1 8l'l8B6ed 1n

the performance of du.ties pursuant to this order.
Tho BOerd is authorized to appoint and fix the com-

penoat1on of 1ts offlcors . emminars, cediatoro. ump1roo , and arbitrators, and the Chairman ls authorb;ed

to o.ppoint and f1I the compensation or other necessarv
emp'-oyces of tho Board.

The Boa.rd shall ava11 1tself .

1noofn.r as practicable . of tho aorvices and fao1llt1es
of tho Of flee for Emorgenoy

~ent and of other

departments and agenoies of the Government.

6.

Upon the appointment of the Board and

the d.ec1gciat1on

or

!ts chairman. the National Defense

Med1ct1on Boord ostablished by exeo~t1ve order No. 8716
of. Mo.roh 19, 1941 , Ghal.1 cease to e:dst,

All employees

9f the National Defense Mediation Board shall bO transferred to tho board uithont aeq¢r1ns by suoh trarwrer
any

c l ~ 1n grade or eivll serv:toe status .. ~i

records , pnpers, end propert1, and all unexpected fundo

s
and a;ppropr1at1ons for the use and "'""int
enance or the
1: tlona.l Dafense Med1at1on Board a.hall bo t rans r erred
All dutlss With respeot to oases oert1-

to the Board.
f led to the

t1onal Defense Mediation Board shall 00

asaw:ic(1 by tho Board for discharge under the provisions

or thia order.
:

7. Nothlng here1n shall be construed

ea

ouperooding or 1n conflict with the provisions of tho
Railway labor Aot (Aot of Bar 20, 1926. as amended, 44

Stat. 926, ll85; 49 Stat. 1169& 45 U. 8. Code 151) ,
the mlt1ono.l Lobor Relation Aot (Act of JulJ 5, 1935,

4•9 Stat. 457, 29 U.

s.

Code 151 et seq.) , the Fair

bor Standards Act (Aot of Juno 25, 19,a; 52 Stat.
1060, 29

u. s.

Coda 201 et seq.) , and the Aot to pro-

v1de cond.1t1ons for the purchase of supplies , etc. ,
approved Juno 30. 1936 (49 Stat. 20)6; 41

u.

8. Code ,

Soct1cns 34-45) , or the Act am(JndinS the Act of Earoh

3 , 1931, rolatlog to the rate of wage a tor laborer a
and

40

tl"'ChaniOS ,

u. s.

approved AUtust JO. 19;5 (49 Stat. lOllr

code , section 276 et oeq.).
FBANKLIN D. ROOSE'IIWX

APPENDIX B
EXECUTIVE ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT
Prov1d1ng for the stabilization of the
National Economy
lsGUed October

J, 1942

By virtue of the authority vested 1n mo by

the Consv1tnt1on and statutes. and particularly by
the act of October 2. 1942, entitled "An Act to Amend

the Emergency Price Control Act or 1942, to aid 1n preventing 1nfle.t1on, and for other purposes".

As President

of the United States and Commnder•1n-Ch1of of the Army
and Navy, and 1n order to control eo far as possible

tho 1nfle.t1onery tendencies snd the vast d1elooat1ons
attendant thereon w~oh threaten our m111tor1 effort
. '
.
and our domest!.o economic structure . and for the more
effoot1ve prosecution of the wor, it !s hereby ordered
as follows:
TI'TI,E I

~stflbllshment of M, Office of_Eom2~
8teb111zo.t1on

1.

Thore 1s eatabl1shed in the Office for

Emorgenoy M.E.ulagemont of the Executive Offloo of th

2

President en Off1oe
head

or which shall

or Economic Stab1l!zat1on at the
be a.n Economic Stab111zat1on

Director (hera1nafter referred to as the D1reotor).
2.

There ts established 1n the Office of

Rcono:nio Stab111zat1on an Econonio Stab111zat1on
Boord u1th whloh the mrcctor shall advise and consult.

The Board sha.11 consist of the seorotai·y or

tho Treasury, the Seorete.ry of Agriculture, the Seoretary of Labor, tho Chairman of the Board of Governors
of the ederal Boserve System, the D1reotor of the
BureQU of the Budget, the Pr1ce Ad.m1n1strator~ the
Chairman of the Na.t1onal War Labor Board, and two repreaontat1voa each

or labor, manegement, and farmers

to be appointed bJ the Pres1dent.

The Director cay

lnv!to for consultation tho head of any other department or agency.

The d1reotor shall serve as Cha1rman

or tho Boo.rd.
3. The D1reotor , uith the approval of the
President, oball formulato and develop a comprehensive
nat1ona.l eoonomto polloy role.ting to the oontrol of
o!.v1l1an purohas1n.g power , prices , rents,: wages,
salaries, profits, rat1on1.ng, subsidies, and all related me.tters-all for the purpose of preventing
avoidable increases 1n the cost of l1v1ns, cooperating

3
1n m1nlm1e1ng the unnecessary :migration of labor from

one bus1neos. industry. or region to another, and
facllltattng the proseautton of the war.

To s1ve

effect to this oomprehensive nat1onal eoonolllio pol!oy

the Direotor shall have power to issue d1root1ve0 on
policy to the Fodoral dopartments and agencies
concerned.
4.

The gu1d1ng policy or the D1..·ootor end

or e.11 departoents and asenoios or tho Govornment shall
be to cooperato 1n tno exeoutlon

or suoh administrative

programs and in the develop::ient of suoh los1slat1ve
programs os may be necessary to that end.

t·ha ad.mini ...

strntlcn of activities related to the nat!onal ocono111T
policy sha11 remain with the dopartment and ageno1es
tl(.'IW

responsible for su_oh aet1vi ti'.!s. but such adnin1-

etro.t1on shall oonform to tho dlrectlvos on policy
issued by the Director.
i'ITLE II

!/.0&£S and AAl-¥J: 8tap111pt1on .Policz
1.

No increase 1n wage rates , granted as a

result of Voluntary agreement . colleot1ve bargaining.
cono111at1on, arbitration, or othern1se , and no

4

deorease 1n wage rates, shall bo authorized unless

notice or auoh increases or decreases shall have been
f1led with the National War Labor Board, and unleas

tha National We.r Labor Board has approved such 1n-

oreascs or decreases.
2.

The National War Labor Board shall not

approve any lnoreaso 1n the wage rates prevailing on
September 15, 1942, unless such increase 1s neoeosary

to correct maladjustments or inequalities to el1m1nate
substandards of liv1ng, to oorreot great 1nequ1t1es,
or to aid in the effeot1ve prosecution

or the w-ar.

ProV1dod. however , that where the National
War Ie.bor Board or the Price Adm,n1atrator shall have

reason to bol1eve that a proposed wage increase will

, requ1ro a change in the pr1ce ce111ng of the

oo.::nmod1t7

or aerv1oe involved., such proposed increase , 1f app1·oved by the National Wc.r labor Board, shall become

effect1ve only 11' also approved by the D1reotor.
The National War Labor Board shall not

).

approve n decrease 1n the wages for any part1oular work
belou the highest ~agas paid therefore between January 1 ,
1942, ~d September 15 1 1942, unlesa to correct gross
1noqu1tias and to a1d 1n the offect1ve prosecution of

.
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4.

The National War Labor Board shall . by

genc!'al ragu,la,tion• make such exemptions from the
provisions of this title in the case or small total

wage 1ncresses or decreases as it deems necessary
for tho effective administration of this Order.

5.
of

es.ooo per

Mo 1noreases in salaries now in excess

year (except 1n instances in wnlon an

1nd1vidu.al has boe11 assigned to more d1ff1cult or

responsible work) . shall be granted unt11 otherwise
deterim.ned by the Director.

6.

?Jo decrease shall be made 1n the salary

for any part1oular work below the h1ghcst .selary
pa1d th0rcfor between January L. 1942 end September

15. 1942. unless to cor~ect gross inequities and to
ald 1n the effoot1ve proseout1on of the war.
?s

In order to correct gross 1nequit1es
•

and to prov1do for greater ~qlidl.1tv in contributing
to the war 0ffort, the Director 1s authorized to take
the neceasary a~t1:_on and to 1arrue the appropr~te
regulations. so that. insofar as practicable. no.salary

shall be authorized under T1tle III. Section 4 to

the extent that 1t exceeds 825, 000 after the payment
taxes .ell:ocablt, to the sum 1n exoesa or t251000.

or

6

.

.Provtded, however . that sueh :reguJ.at1ons shall make

due allowance for the payment of life 1nsuranoe premiums on pol1oies heretofore incurred, and shall mako

prons1on to prevent undue hardship.

8 . The pol1oy or the Federal Government.
as esoo.bliched 1n Exeouttve order no. 9017 of Januar;y
12 , 1942, to encourage ~ree aolleotive 1xu~sa1n1ng
between employers and employees 1s reaffir med and

cont tnued.
9.

Insofar as the provisions or c1a,1se l

of Section 302 (c) of the Emorgoncy F:!'lce c ont1'ol Act
of 19~·2• are 1nc·o ns1stent -1th this Order, they a.re

hereby nuspended .
TITLE III
!_d.m1n1str;t19n of Wage and Sa!ar1 Poltcz
1.

Exocpt as modified by this Order. the

Natl0%lal Wor Labor Board shall continue to perform
the po;rera . f unct1ons. Qlld dut1ee conferred upon 1.t
by Exeeutlve Order No. 9017, and the functions of said

Board and her eby extended to oover all tnduatr1ee and
I

ail.l employees.

The National Ua::.• Labor Beard shall con-

tinue to f ollow the procedures speo1f1ed in a·o1d

Exeout1vo Order .

7
2•

The Nat1onal ilar Labor Board shall eon-

ctitute the agency or the Federal Governl'.11.ent authorized. to carr y out the 1,0.ge po11o1ea stated 1n th1e
I

Order . or the dlrect!ves on policy issued by the D1r octor under th1a Order.

The National War Labor Board

1a fur ther authorized to 1saue sueh rules and regulations as

ma.u

be necessary for the speedy det~rm1nat1on

of the propriety of any wage increases or dooreases
ln eccordanoe With th1a Order. and to ave.11 itself of

the eerv1cee and facilities of aueh State and Federal
depart_nents &nd agonoles ae, 1n the d1scret1on of the
Matloncl War labor Board, may be of assistance to the

aoara.
3. No prov1s1on With roapoct to wages
conto.lned ln arzy labor agreemer..t between employers
and employees (inolud1ng the Sh1pbu1ldtng Stab111zat1on
Agreement as amended on May 16. 1942, and the

t-Jage

ata'b1llzat1on Agreement of the BU1ld1ng conatruotion
Inud.Dtry arr1v d at

?,1aY

22, 1942) wh1ch is 1noons1stent

.1itl:. the pol1CJ herein enunciated or hereafter formu-

lated by the D1reotor shall be enforced except wlth
the approval of the National W~ Ie.bor Board. within

the prov1s1ons of' th1s order.

The National War Labor

Board Blnll permit the Sb1pbu1ld1ng stab111zat1on

8

Committee and the Wage Adjustment ~rd ror Bu1id1ng

Construction Industry. both of which are provided for
in the foregoing agreement. to cont1nue to perform
the!r fWlct1ons therein eet forth . exoept 1nsorar as
any of them ls inconsistent with tbe terms

or

th1s

Order.
4.

or

this order and the Act or October 2 .

t:rage

or sala.Ty payment; made 1n contra-

prov1a1ona

1942 • orq

In order to eff~otuato tne purposes and

vention thereof shall be disregarded. by- the EXecutive
Depo.rtmentc and other Governeontcl ageno1es 1n determin•

1ng t~e cost or expenses of any employer for the purpooe

of any lau or regulation. including tho Jzergenoy Pr1co
Control Act or 1942. or any maxtmu.m prloe regulation
thereof . or for tho ~urpose of caloulat1ns doduet1ons

under the Revenue taus of the Un1ted States or for tho
purpose of detcrm1liing coat or c~enses under any contract mo.de by or on behelf of the Gove~fflt of .the

united states.

TITLE IV

Prices of Ag;:1oultur!l Com.mod1t1es (omitted)
TITLE V
Prof&ts and Sub~1d1!! (om1 tted)
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TITLE VI

Gener§l Prg;v:1s1ons (omitted)
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

THE WHITE HOUSE
October 3, 1942

